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European Union and United States approaches towards 
Egypt: the trap of short-term realism 
Brice Didier 
As promoted by President Al-Sisi during his European 
tour in early November 2017, culminating in the 
conclusion of new arms sales contracts, Egypt has 
adopted a pragmatic approach to its regional order 
and world politics. This approach arguably allows it to 
concomitantly restore its regional leadership and its 
ties with Western partners. 
By openly communicating about the risk posed by 
potential domestic instability for the Arab world as a 
whole – a risk that became most apparent with the 
recent terrorist attacks on a Sufi mosque in northern 
Sinai – Al-Sisi has been seeking to put pressure on and 
gain support from both the Gulf countries and the West, 
primarily the United States (US), the European Union 
(EU) and its member states. To attain his goal of 
preventing a new revolution, he has transformed Egypt 
into a ‘military/security rentier’ regime, which draws 
benefits from what others perceive as security-related 
imperatives in order to ensure the Egyptian military’s 
status of a guardian of the country’s stability, and hence 
the stability of the region. For their part, EU and US 
approaches towards Egypt have diverged. The two 
players have neutralized each other’s efforts in terms of 
human rights and democracy promotion on the one 
hand and military strategic perspectives on the other 
hand, allowing Al-Sisi to ‘shop’ for support from 
Washington and European capitals. Indeed, the US has 
hesitated to respond to the regime’s human rights 
infringements and has (reluctantly) renewed some of  
its military support. The EU member states, by contrast, 
have accommodated the Egyptian President’s 
authoritarianism due to concerns regarding migration 
and terrorist threats. As a result, Al-Sisi has been able to 
portray himself as indispensable for the West.  
Starting with a discussion of the US and EU’s recent 
realist shifts vis-à-vis Cairo, this policy brief confronts 
short-term transatlantic relational approaches with the 
necessity of a less security-focussed and more 
pragmatic perspective in the longer term. It argues that 
a transatlantic consensus would be able to constrain the 
power of Al-Sisi in order to enhance democracy in the 
country and limit human rights abuses.  
Executive Summary 
> Since the overthrow of President Morsi by the 
military in 2013, domestic developments in 
Egypt have had a ‘cancellation effect’ on the 
transition process toward democracy initiated 
in 2011. 
> Increasingly used by the US as a strategic relay 
and by the EU as a watchman, Egypt heavily 
relies on Western economic aid and military 
support to sustain itself. 
> While in the US, Trump’s approach falls in line 
with Obama’s realism, the European Union is 
returning to a pre-Arab Spring accommodation 
of authoritarianism, revealing a pervasiveness 
of short-term realism among Western views on 
Egypt.  
> Renewed realist approaches in Washington 
and European capitals comfort Cairo, allowing 
Al-Sisi to ‘shop’ for support on both sides of the 
Atlantic.  
> By contrast, enhanced EU-US convergence 
towards greater attention for democracy and 
human rights would compel the regime to 
initiate social and societal reforms fostering 
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Egypt as a ‘geopolitical pivot’: America’s strategic 
relay, Europe’s watchman 
 
Thanks to its leading role in Sunni Islam, Egypt 
possesses considerable soft power. In combination with 
its status as the premier demographic, military, 
intellectual and political power of the Arab world, the 
country uses its leverage to claim the role of a bridge-
builder between the Arab region and the wider world. 
Yet, given its location at a geographical crossroad, Egypt 
has long been considered as a ‘geopolitical pivot’ 
(Brzezinski 1997), attracting the interests of bigger 
powers. With its own regional ambitions constrained by 
major demographic and economic difficulties, Cairo has 
thus been compelled to look for external support. 
Since the second half of the 20th century, Egypt has 
progressively lost most of its political and institutional 
clout, growing more and more dependent on the US. 
From a power without influence, Egypt has developed 
into a power under influence. An indispensable ally 
which has become the second largest beneficiary of US 
military aid after Israel, Egypt turned into a strategic 
relay for the projection of US (military) power in the 
Middle East. Considering that the US desires to keep 
Egypt within its sphere of influence and avoid 
competition from, for instance, the EU, Egypt-US 
relations can be regarded as mutually interdependent.  
The EU, in turn, has had difficulties in voicing dissent vis-
à-vis the US, and has thus largely supported the 
American Egypt strategy. Nevertheless, the priority 
given in the 1990s to the establishment of a zone of 
peace and prosperity in its Southern neighbourhood has 
highlighted diverging views between the two sides of 
the Atlantic. Through the Union for the Mediterranean 
(UfM), the EU promoted a partnership-based approach 
while setting aside domestic problems such as human 
rights violations and authoritarianism (Daguzan 2016). 
The fact that the co-presidency of the UfM was 
accorded to Mubarak’s Egypt in 2008 highlighted that 
the EU envisioned Egypt as a watchman on the 
Southern shores of the Mediterranean, not in the least 
to shield the EU from migratory pressures.  
 
The paradox of reciprocally neutralizing transatlantic 
approaches 
 
Brought into power by democratic elections after the 
2011 uprising against the neo-patrimonial regime of 
President Mubarak, President Morsi and the Muslim 
Brothers used their legitimacy as a pretext to refuse any 
form of political compromise with other forces, and 
were quickly removed from power again by the military. 
This interference of the military was legitimized by the 
increase of violence and the fear of a civil war between 
the Young Revolutionaries and the Muslim Brothers, 
with the former blaming the latter for stealing their 
revolution (Messiha & Teulon 2014). Hence, in light of 
the popular hostility to President Morsi and the Muslim 
Brothers, this overthrow was interpreted by experts not 
as a military coup, but as a new chapter of the Arab 
Spring (Kepel 2013). Arguably, developments since this 
overthrow have shown that it has been more of a 
counterrevolution and a final curtain call for the 
democratisation process.  
The Arab Spring can to a certain extent be explained by 
the relative absence of the Mediterranean from Euro-
Atlantic power dynamics in the late 2000s/early 2010s, 
weakening the authoritarian regimes domestically. To 
remedy the instability in the Middle East, the 
preservation of the West’s power has for a long time 
justified the accommodation of authoritarian regimes. 
Although democracy promotion has been a general 
objective of post-Cold War US foreign policy, the MENA 
region has been an exception, insofar as authoritarian 
regimes were eager to collaborate (Bouchet 2016). This 
tendency partially explains the absence of an 
institutionalized approach to democracy promotion 
between Europe and the US (Babayan & Risse 2017).  
Following the initial abandonment of this MENA 
exception by the George W. Bush administration, 
President Obama made democratisation a key objective 
of his Middle East agenda as enounced in Cairo in 2009, 
in order to re-establish the Arab world’s trust in the US. 
After the Arab Spring, and considering that dialogue 
with political Islam could not be totally excluded, the 
Obama administration adopted a legalist approach, 
which proved to be rather tolerant with the Muslim 
Brothers, and pragmatically tried to accommodate the 
democratisation process in Egypt in order to preserve 
US interests. Nevertheless, this has not prevented the 
US response to abuses following Morsi’s overthrow by 
the military – which Washington did not qualify as a 
coup – from being equivocal. 
This hesitancy was not specific to the US approach, but 
could also be detected in the EU’s reactions to the Arab 
Spring. Historically considering the stability and security 
provided by authoritarian regimes to be more 
important than democratic change, the EU and its 
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member states were compelled to deal with new actors 
after the Arab Spring. Paradoxically, the post-Arab 
Spring update of the EU’s Mediterranean policy 
questioned the previous regional partnership-based 
approach by offering further differentiation, and was 
accompanied by a stricter conditionality than before 
vis-à-vis new democratic regimes. This demonstrated 
how difficult it is for Europeans to accept the novel 
character of these uprisings. It highlights the fear of 
what High Representative Catherine Ashton in 2011 
referred to as ‘surface democracy’ in the long run 
(Ashton 2011). Such concerns appeared even more 
concrete after the victory of the Muslim Brothers in 
2012, a potential factor of deterioration of the 
relationship with the West. This explains the Union’s 
ambiguous reaction to Morsi’s overthrow, which 
exhibited an indecisiveness between a value-based 
perspective and strategic constraints.  
 
A progressive return to pre-Arab Spring transatlantic 
perspectives 
 
The indulgence of the Obama administration vis-à-vis 
Morsi and the Muslim Brothers and its denunciations of 
human rights infringements led to an era of diplomatic 
cold, embodied in military aid cuts after the repression 
of pro-Morsi demonstrations in 2013. However, despite 
a renewal of anti-Americanism born out of the idea that 
the US was at the origins of the 2011 revolution, Al-Sisi’s 
Egypt has not yet questioned the crucial importance of 
US support, on which its regional security and domestic 
stability depends. Moreover, even if it was willing to 
progressively withdraw from the MENA region, the US 
cannot abandon Egypt, given its geostrategic 
importance. Combining a liberal perspective on human 
rights with a realist position regarding geostrategic 
imperatives, Obama’s Middle East policy happened to 
be less ‘monolithic’ than expected. It thus revealed a 
certain degree of transatlantic convergence.  
Following Donald Trump’s electoral victory in 
November 2016, the first Arab leader to welcome the 
new US President was Al-Sisi. He paid a visit to the 
White House in April 2017, expecting a reinforcement 
of the bilateral relationship between his country and 
the US (Bauchard 2017), which would take shape 
through in-depth political dialogue and a reinforcement 
of economic aid and military support. Even though this 
rapprochement culminated in Trump’s announcement 
of his intention to visit Cairo and of the renewal of US 
military support and the initiative to list the Muslim 
Brotherhood as a terrorist entity, the honeymoon was 
short. Indeed, there has been limited progress in the 
diplomatic relations between Washington and Cairo to 
date, mainly due to concerns regarding the lack of 
progress on the human rights record. The US decided in 
August 2017 to cut $96 million in economic and military 
aid and to hold off an additional $195 million to Egypt 
(Mohammed & Strobel 2017). Altogether, in spite of its 
will to break with Obama’s heritage, Trump’s Egypt 
policy rather falls in line with his predecessor’s. 
Even though it is trapped in a second-tier role due to US 
dominance, the EU must now develop a long-term 
strategic approach which respects its normative values 
if it wishes to sustain its influence in Egypt and the wider 
region in the long run. When it supervised the 2014 
Egyptian presidential election, the EU seemed to want 
to give a democratic appearance to the military 
authoritarian regime (Da Vasconcelos 2014). It proved 
even more accommodating when it reactivated the 
Association Agreement in 2015, which had been 
suspended in 2011. The fear of political Islam might 
partly explain Europe’s preference for stability in the 
short term. At the same time, the Union might also be 
motivated by a desire to ensure a renewed top-down 
stability in Egypt, which could allow the EU to preserve 
its geostrategic interests at the regional level.  
As for now, Europe has put itself in a weaker position, 
held hostage by Al-Sisi, who knows that the EU and its 
member states need him in order to deal with terrorism 
and migration issues. As the EU is faced with the risk of 
losing ground in the region, more recent developments 
tend to indicate a return to a long-standing pre-Arab 
Spring accommodation of authoritarianism by building 
economic and political ties with Al-Sisi’s regime at the 
expense of human rights and democracy. By acting in 
this way, the EU seems to neglect the main lesson from 
the Arab Spring: domestic stability without societal 
prosperity is not sustainable in the long run. To the 
stability-development nexus, Europe prefers the 
security-stability one. Such short-term realism appears 
as rather inefficient due to the lack of domestic political 
reforms in Egypt: the slow pace of institutional reforms 
fails to adequately respond to the need for urgent 
socio-economic progress (El-Shimy & Dworkin 2017). It 
may prove to be even more fragile in the long term, as 
contestation may arise from the Egyptian society as well 
as within the military due to increasing economic and 
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institutional weaknesses accentuated by the magnitude 
of repression and underlying societal divides. 
Despite their apparent impotence, Europe and the US 
have considerable leverage over Egypt, especially given 
that Cairo does not have many other alternatives for 
external sponsorship. As Euro-Atlantic interests in the 
Mediterranean depend on constraints the EU and the 
US are commonly faced with (e.g. migration, terrorist 
threats, access to resources), it is necessary for the 
transatlantic partners to pragmatically agree on greater 
cooperation in order to create new incentives in favour 




A convergence of EU and US approaches would have 
deep implications for the future of Egypt and the 
broader regional order. Nevertheless, caution is needed 
when it comes to the substance of such a common view. 
Indeed, as long as its strategic projection towards the 
MENA region prevails, and in a context of terrorist 
threats, the Trump administration is bound to fall back 
on a realist approach to Egypt and accommodate Al-
Sisi’s military rentier regime. Such a trend might soon 
be visible through the renewal of US military support, 
following a meeting of both Presidents on the side-lines 
of the UN General Assembly in September. With the EU 
being somewhat accommodating as well, this move 
might result in the transatlantic partners once again 
accepting the reality of the authoritarian status quo and 
turning their backs on the liberal values of democracy in 
the name of the realist imperative of stability.  
Instead of passively acting as de facto sponsors of an 
authoritarian regime, the transatlantic partners would 
be well-advised to use their leverage over a country that 
has been considerably weakened in its region to avoid 
the trap of short-term realism  and create new 
incentives to further support human rights and 
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